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Abstract  
The attempted coup in Turkey in July 2016 provided a justification for the Turkish government to silence 
oppositional voices in the media and close down many television stations. Though the stated aim was to 
clamp down on the pro-coup Gulenist movement, the closure of TV channels has resulted in what I call a 
‘communicative ethnocide’ silencing Alevi television in particular. Following Yalcinkaya, who builds on 
Clastres concept of ethnocide, I define ‘communicative ethnocide’ as the annihilation of the communicative 
capacity of a particular community by the state with the aim of destroying that community’s cultural 
identity. Although the closure of TV stations was not confined to Alevi channels, it has particular 
implications for the Alevi community by destroying its communicative capacity, infrastructure, relations with 
the viewers, and representation regime which are driven by the community’s political ambitions and 
attempts to sustain transnational connections. Parallels are drawn between Alevi and Kurdish TV to 
illustrate the Turkish context. 
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Introduction 
 
Turkey was shaken by an attempted coup d’état on 15 July 2016 allegedly orchestrated by Gulenists, an 
Islamist movement which until very recently had been a close ally of Turkey’s ruling party the AKP 
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – Justice and Development Party). Afterwards, as of July 2017, more than 
50,000 people have been arrested  
 including 12 members of parliament; over 111,000 civil servants including more than 6000 academics have been 
sacked and banned from public service; and 110 media insti-tutions have been closed down 
(http://www.chp.org.tr/Public/0/Folder//66594.pdf, accessed 31 July 2017). The coup attempt and the following 
measures taken by the government have also had serious implications for the Turkish media landscape with 159 
journalists arrested and 31 television channels and 34 radio stations closed down 
(http://www.chp.org.tr/Public/0/Folder//66594.pdf). Although the government claims that they have supposedly 
targeted the Gulenist media in particular, the attempted coup has provided an excuse for the Turkish government to 
silence the opposition, including Alevis, the Kurdish movement and leftists.  
Alevis are the second largest religious group in Turkey with an estimated population of 15 to 20 million, but their 
religion is not recognised by the Turkish state and Alevis have a long history of persecution dating back to the 16th 
century (Sokefeld, 2008; White and Jongerden, 2003). More recently the ‘illegitimate’ status of Alevis in Turkey, along 
with economic reasons, has resulted in many leaving Turkey for Western Europe and today there is a vibrant Alevi 
community in Europe with an estimated 400,000 to 600,000 Alevis in Germany (Massicard, 2010) and 300,000 in the 
United Kingdom (http://www. alevinet.org/SAP.aspx?pid = About_en-GB, accessed 15 July 2017). Transnational Alevi 
television has been a significant tool for connecting Alevis living in different countries and has been significant in 
constructing a transnational imagination for them (Emre Cetin, 2018). Three Alevi television stations, Cem TV, TV10 and 
Yol TV were on air before the coup attempt of July 2016, but following it, TV10 was closed down in September 2016 by 
decree under the government’s state of emergency and Yol TV’s broadcasting was suspended in December 2016 by the 
Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTUK) on the grounds of insulting the President, praising terrorist organisa-tions 
and broadcasting without a Turkish licence. Cem TV remains in operation and is based in Turkey while TV10 and Yol TV 
now only use Internet broadcasting mainly from Europe. Given that each TV channel represents a different political 
orientation within the Alevi community, the fact that the Turkish government approached each one differently is 
significant in terms of the communicative ethnocide and its nuances that will be dis-cussed in detail in this article. 
 
By looking at the current Turkish media landscape, and Alevi television in particu-lar, my aim is to demonstrate 
that ethnocide as a cultural annihilation also has serious consequences in terms of media communication. I argue 
that the closure of Alevi television stations in Turkey is an attempt at the communicative ethnocide of the 
transnational Alevi community by silencing the multiple voices within that commu-nity, weakening its transnational 
connections, and damaging the multispatiality between the local, national, and transnational that was fundamentally 
supported by Alevi television. I start by providing a theoretical framework on ethnocide by draw-ing on Appadurai 
(2006), Clastres (2010) and Yalcinkaya (2014) followed by a dis-cussion of the context in which the ethnic media 
operates in Turkey with a particular focus on Kurdish and Alevi media. I then introduce the concept of 
communicative ethnocide and discuss its relevance for the contemporary transnational Alevi commu-nity. The 
discussion primarily draws on data from interviews with 14 TV channel workers such as producers, executives and 
presenters based in Germany who worked 
for TV stations closed by the Turkish government and which were conducted as part of a broader research on Alevi 
television. 
 
Ethnocide: the cultural annihilation of a community 
 
Genocide is a legal term which refers to the destruction of a community by persecuting its members. Although the term is 
primarily used to address the persecution of the Jewish community by the Nazis during World War II, this was not the first 
act of genocide and many communities were intentionally destroyed before this time including the Armenians in Turkey 
during the First World War (Akcam, 2013). Lemkin (cited in Clavero, 2008), who coined the term genocide, has suggested 
that the term ethnocide can also be used as a synonym and in legal studies ethnocide often refers to cultural genocide and 
the cultural destruction of indigenous cultures (Clavero, 2008). In the 1970s, it was particularly used in relation to 
indigenous cultures in the Americas (Barabas and Bartholeme, 1973; Escobar, 1989; Lizot, 1976; Venkateswar, 2004), 
although later the concept has been used to explain the cultural destruction of different communities living in different 
countries (Casula, 2015; Clarke, 2001; Lemarchand, 1994; Williams, 2002). A report by the United Nations on the 
genocide of indigenous populations refers to ethnocide as follows: 
 
In cases where such [state] measures can be described as acts committed for the deliberate purpose of eliminating the culture 
of a group by systematically destructive and obstructive action, they could be deemed to constitute clear cases of ethnocide or 
cultural genocide. (Cited in Clavero, 2008: 99) 
 
Ethnocide can be regarded as a cultural weapon which aims to destroy the culture of a community with or without 
killing its members. While genocide, according to Clastres (2010), aims to annihilate the body as the marker of race, 
ethnocide annihilates the mind; it is, he argues, ‘the systematic destruction of ways of living and thinking of people from 
those who lead this venture of destruction’ (p. 103). Although Clastres makes a compari-son between genocide and 
ethnocide, he does not equate one with the other, and acknowl-edges that the destruction of bodies is worse than the 
destruction of a culture but only on the grounds that ‘less barbarity is better than more barbarity’ (p. 103). Williams’ 
(2002) definition of the ‘culture as ordinary’ allows us to reflect on the everyday dimensions of ethnocide where we can 
see how it interrupts, transforms and distorts the everyday prac-tices of an ethnic community, including its rites and rituals, 
that provide it with its par-ticular characteristics. Ethnocide can take different forms such as suggesting the adoption of 
alternative rituals to those specific to the community or forcibly replacing them with different practices, or the destruction 
of culturally significant spaces where everyday practices and encounters take place, and so on. Hence, ethnocide can be 
thought of as a programme which attacks the culture of communities on a day-to-day basis.  
Essential to both genocide and ethnocide is the concept of the ‘Other’, since in both cases the Other means difference 
and this difference has to be dealt with. For this reason, in making sense of ethnocide, it is useful to compare it to 
genocide’s vision of the Other. While the genocidal mind sees the Other as evil and wants to eliminate it, the ethnocidal 
mind wishes to transform it by eliminating the difference and making the Other identical 
  
to itself. Whereas the genocidal mind sees a hierarchy of races with its own superior to others, the ethnocidal mind 
presupposes a hierarchy of cultures (Clastres, 2010). In this sense, ethnocide involves a cultural war against the 
Other with the aim of diminishing the characteristics of what makes the Other different and foreseeing an eventual 
assimila-tion of the Other into the mainstream, thus ‘reducing the Other to the same’ by ‘the dis-solution of the 
multiple into one’ (Clastres, 2010: 108).  
For Clastres (2010), it is a universal fact that all cultures are ethnocentric but being ethnocentric does not necessarily 
entail that a culture is ethnocidal. For this to occur, particular tools and opportunities are required and these are afforded 
through the forma-tion of the state. For Clastres, the state is a requirement and precondition for ethnocide: 
 
All state organizations are ethnocidal, ethnocide is the normal mode of existence of the State. There is thus a certain 
universality to ethnocide, in that it is the characteristic not only of a vague, indeterminate ‘white world’, but of a whole 
ensemble of societies which are societies with a State. (p. 111) 
 
Simply put, the systematic cultural elimination of the Other requires the state’s organ-ised and institutionalised power. 
To this can be added the observation by Appadurai (2006) that it is not minorities who are violent but rather the state 
which engages in violence because of how the state reacts to them. Minorities according to Appadurai (2006): 
 
[…] create uncertainties about the national self and national citizenship because of their mixed status. Their legally ambiguous 
status puts pressures on constitutions and legal orders. Their movements threaten the policing of borders. Their financial 
transactions blur the lines between national economies and between legal and criminal transactions. Their languages 
exacerbate worries about national cultural coherence. Their lifestyles are easy ways to displace widespread tensions in society, 
especially urban society. Their politics tend to be multifocal, so they are always sources of anxiety to security states. (pp. 44–
45) 
 
For both authors, violence is seen as inherent in the existence of the state and the need to engage in systematic violence 
both leads to and requires the organisational capacity of the state. It is important to emphasise this interconnection in order 
to understand the complexity of ethnocide as a cultural form of violence. While Clastres sees ethnocide as an inherent 
characteristic of state societies and considers ethnocide as a tool that can be used by every state, he also recognises the 
potential for resistance by the Other in such societies. For Clastres, ‘the ability of resistance of the oppressed minority’ 
means that ethnocide is not an inescapable fate for the Other (p. 103). Whether the Other is able to resist ethnocide or not 
depends on the community’s history and the way that the com-munity is organised. One needs to look at the community’s 
capacity as well as the state’s approach in a given historical context in order to understand the extent of ethnocide.  
According to Yalcinkaya (2014), the Turkish state’s approach towards Alevis must be seen as a form of ethnocide even 
though Alevis themselves have tended to view it rather as assimilation. Yalcinkaya (2014: 23) argues that the state’s 
policies towards Alevis is an attempt at getting them to comply with the state’s definition of the ideal citizen, and for this 
reason, ethnocide is a more accurate concept to understand the state’s approach towards Alevis. Unlike assimilation which 
aims at destroying Alevi as an identity along with Alevi 
cultural practices so that culturally Alevis become indistinguishable from the Sunni Muslim majority, the Turkish state is 
concerned with redefining Alevis and their culture to produce a political identity commensurate with that of the ideal 
Turkish citizen. Yalcinkaya adopts a Foucauldian approach which sees ethnocide as a creative activity that creates an 
identity while transforming it according to the desires of the state. The state’s ethnocide does not aim at destroying Alevis 
per se, instead it seeks to destroy the community’s internal order and its power of self-regulation (Yalcinkaya, 2014: 32) 
and lying at the core of this ethno-cidal project is the religious practices of Alevis. The state wants to transform Alevi 
identity through displacing, redesigning and re-conceptualising Alevi rites and rituals (Yalcinkaya, 2014). The discussion 
of whether the cemevi, a place where Alevis conduct their religious ceremony of the cem, is a place of worship and 
whether the cem itself is a religious cere-mony exemplify this approach. The state resists recognising the cemevi and the 
cem as essentially and distinctively religious and instead attempts to redefine them as ‘culturally deviant’ practices. 
Similarly, Alevism is treated as a branch or sect within Islam despite the denial of many Alevis that this is the case.1 In this 
respect, Yalcinkaya (2014) particularly focuses on the period in which the AKP government launched various projects 
involving Alevis, such as the Muharrem Fast Breaking, the Alevi Opening, the Alevi Workshops and the Mosque-Cemevi 
project. At the Muharrem Fast Breaking in 2008, Alevi faith leaders, dedes, were invited to break their Muharrem fasts 
according to Islamic conventions and at some official meetings such as the Alevi Workshops in 2009 the dedes were 
treated as though they were tariqa leaders, that is leaders of an Islamic school of Sufism (Borovali and Boyraz, 2015; 
Ecevitoglu and Yalcinkaya, 2013; Lord, 2017).  
With the fundamental change in the political climate since the 2016 coup attempt, the government’s attitudes 
towards Alevis have hardened and Alevis have been targeted by a programme of communicative ethnocide. 
However, before discussing the nature and extent of this communicative ethnocide. it is necessary to discuss the 
Turkish state’s approach towards the ethnic media, and in the next section, I examine not only Alevi television but 
also another ethnic media, Kurdish television, to provide a wider under-standing of the Turkish context. 
 
The ethnic media in Turkey: Kurdish and Alevi television  
Kurdish television 
 
Originally dispersed into four states, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey, the Kurds are currently a large community of which 
there are an estimated 14 million in Turkey and 850,000 in Europe (http://www.institutkurde.org/en/kurdorama/, accessed 
15 July 2017). While the Kurdish movement dates back to the late Ottoman period, the struggle gained consider-able 
momentum in 1978 with the formation of the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiye Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK)) and their 
policy of armed opposition to the Turkish state and call for independence, later for autonomy and cultural rights. Kurdish 
television broad-casting in the Turkish context has been very much framed by this armed conflict and political struggle as 
well as international crises in the region. It makes an interesting case study of a medium for an ethnic group which does 
not have a state yet is aiming to build a national identity through television in a transnational context (Hassanpour, 1998, 
2003; 
 Sinclair and Smets, 2014; Smets, 2016). I shall argue that the experience of Kurdish broadcasting in Europe, starting 
with Med TV and followed by Medya TV and Roj TV, illustrates an active form of communicative ethnocide which 
has strong parallels with the fate of Alevi television broadcasting.  
Med TV started its broadcasts from the United Kingdom in 1995 with a licence from the Independent Television 
Commission (ITC) granted for 10 years. However, as a result of diplomatic pressure from the Turkish state, less than 4 
years later in March 1999 its licence was revoked by the ITC (Sinclair and Smets, 2014: 324) with accusations that the 
channel supported ‘terrorism’ and broadcast ‘hate propaganda’ (Hassanpour, 1998, 2003). This was followed by raids on 
the studios of Med TV, arrests of the television staff and the seizure of its computers and hardware from its offices in 
Belgium, Germany and the United Kingdom after which it began its broadcasts via the French based Eutelsat until France 
Telecom refused to renew its licence (Hassanpour, 1998, 2003). Following a similar pattern to the political parties 
established by the Kurdish movement which were continuously closed down and re-opened in different names, Med TV 
was re-established again as Medya TV in France in 1999 from which it broadcast until 2004 when the ‘Conseil Superieur 
de l’Audiovisuel (CSA), the French licensing authority, found that Medya TV was merely a successor channel to Med TV 
and revoked its broadcasting licence’ (Sinclair and Smets, 2014: 325). Following Medya TV’s closure, Roj TV, which was 
primarily based in Denmark, replaced the channel. Sinclair and Smets (2014) provide a detailed account of how Roj TV 
led to another international crisis, this time between Denmark and Turkey, involving various parties such as Eutelsat and 
Reporters Without Borders in a long judicial process. In the event the Danish court ruled against a ban on Roj TV and also 
Nuce TV, the latter having been designed as a replacement in case of Roj TV’s closure. Recently, the Kurdish television 
landscape has expanded to include various local, national and transna-tional channels as well as thematic broadcasting 
such as news and children’s television. However, the state of emergency has given an opportunity for the Turkish 
government to silence Kurdish media by arresting Kurdish journalists, closing down news agencies and blacking out 
television channels such as Jiyan, Mezopotamya and Denge. 
 
Alevi television 
 
Being a silenced and invisible community, the first explicit presence of Alevis in the media was through Alevi radio 
channels during the unregulated media environment in Turkey in the 1990s. The neo-liberal economy of the era, along 
with the discourses of ‘being free’ (meaning free from state regulations), allowed various radio stations to flourish (Algan, 
2003; Kaya and Cakmur, 2010). Alevis had been able to establish their presence, raise their voice and reach a broader 
public than could be achieved through the various Alevi magazines that were published at this time. However, due to 
various rea-sons, an Alevi presence on television was relatively late and had to wait until the 2000s. Until then, the 
invisibility of Alevi identity in Turkish society had not allowed the devel-opment of a sustainable financial system to 
support the Alevi media. Due to the fear of persecution in Turkey, Alevis had been unable to organise in large numbers 
and to repre-sent themselves through associations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This lack of community 
resources, along with the fear of Alevi individuals such as business 
 
people who might have held sufficient economic resources to finance media organisa-tions, held back investment in Alevi 
media. However, the Sivas Massacre of 1993, where 35 people who came to Sivas for an Alevi festival were burned to 
death in a hotel, proved to be a turning point for Alevis and was a major boost to the ‘Alevi revival’ which had already 
started in the Alevi community in Europe in the late 1980s (Sokefeld, 2008; White and Jongerden, 2003). This can be 
taken as a turning point for the Alevi media, and by the beginning of the new century, it had paved the way for the 
establishment of Alevi television born out of a burning necessity felt by Alevis to become more visible in the public 
sphere and the need for the self-exploration of their identity.  
The 2000s can be seen as an experimental period for Alevi business people and organ-isations who explored the use of 
satellite broadcasting mostly through European based stations. Among the stations that were established were TV Avrupa 
(based in Germany), Dem TV (based in the United Kingdom), Su TV (based in Germany and later in France), Duzgun TV 
and Kanal 12 (both based in Germany), Cem TV (based in Turkey), Yol TV (based in Germany and later in Turkey), and 
TV 10 (based in Germany and in Turkey) (Emre Cetin, 2018). Most of these television stations had only a brief existence, 
largely as a result of economic reasons along with the political disagreements among the owners that reflected the different 
political orientations within the Alevi community. More recently, there have also been political pressures and under the 
state of emergency declared by the Turkish government after the attempted coup, TV10, which had been on air since 2011, 
was closed in September 2016 and Yol TV, which had been broadcasting since 2006, was suspended in late 2016. Both, 
however, still broadcast on the Internet, although with a reduced audience. Currently, only Cem TV, which has been on air 
since 2005, remains as an Alevi station broadcasting from Turkey.  
What distinguishes these channels from each other is their different interpretations of Alevism and their different 
political orientations, as well as their ownership by different organisations and individuals. TV10 is owned by a group of 
individuals who, in my interviews with them, emphasise their commitment to representing the ethnic, religious and 
political differences within the Alevi community. TV10 is also distinguished by its close-knit ties with the Kurdish 
movement and is thereby primarily regarded as the voice of Alevi Kurds. On the other hand, Yol TV is run by individuals 
who act on behalf of the European Confederation of Alevi Unions which owns the station. The Confederation regards 
Alevism as separate from Islam and as a faith in its own right. It is interesting to note, as we discuss later, that Cem TV, 
the only station not forced by the Turkish govern-ment to suspend its broadcasting, fits in most with the Turkish 
government’s attempts to define Alevism within Turkishness. This is most likely explained by the fact that, as I have 
observed previously, ‘Cem TV is run by the Cem Foundation which espouses an Islamic understanding of Alevism, 
regarding it as a sect of Islam within the sufi tradition, and also emphasises its Turkish origins’ (Emre Cetin, 2018: 97). 
 
Communicative ethnocide: destroying the communicative means of a 
community 
 
Yalcinkaya (2014: 32–35) describes the particular methods through which ethnocide operates. These are displacement of 
the community, destroying its locality and geography, 
 destroying the memory of the community, and the displacement of the community’s per-formances. I would like to 
add another to these, destroying the communicative means of the community and it is this which I refer to as 
communicative ethnocide. Being ‘the sup-pression of cultural differences as deemed inferior or bad’ (Clastres, 2010: 
108), ethno-cidal violence can target the locality, memory, performances and the communicative capacity of the 
community. In other words, communicative ethnocide is not an isolated process but is part of the ethnocidal project 
undertaken on a particular community. Its aim is to destroy the communicative means and capacity of that 
community with the goal of interrupting and eventually annihilating its cultural formation. Communicative 
ethnocide can take place through various means and media including cultural events, social gather-ings, press, 
television, social media and so on. While each venue through which commu-nicative ethnocide operates deserves to 
be investigated in depth, for the purpose of this article, I would like to focus on the communicative ethnocide that 
takes place in the con-text of television broadcasting.  
Communicative ethnocide requires the power of the state because currently states are the main actors regulating 
communication policies through such means as television licences, channel allocations and infrastructural regulations. 
Furthermore, states are the primary actors which hold particular agendas and policies concerning minorities. Taken 
together therefore, ethnocide can be seen as a planned and regulated action of the state. Communicative ethnocide can take 
both a passive form, where the state, for example, sets up legal barriers to the operation of ethnic media, and an active 
form, such as impos-ing a ban on broadcasting in particular languages or interrupting and censoring broad-casting. In both 
cases, the aim is to hinder the interaction between the members of the community and their ability to stimulate and guide 
their social imagination as to what their community is, and to eliminate the multivocality within the community and inter-
rupt the cultural self-reproduction of the community through media. Therefore, it has significant implications in terms of 
identity politics, minority rights and the way collec-tive identities that are underrepresented in the media express 
themselves.  
Communicative ethnocide has a number of consequences for ethnic communities in four main domains: representation, 
language, space and civic engagement. For those communities that are underrepresented in the mainstream media, the 
ethnic media pro-vides opportunities to raise their own voice (Matsaganis et al., 2011), something which communicative 
ethnocide seeks to eliminate by burying communities in order to silence them through demolishing the potential for a 
multivocal media ecology. The ethnic media is also crucial for the linguistic survival of many communities as it serves as 
a mean to revive dying languages and popularise them among community members. Communicative ethnocide diminishes 
this opportunity as well as interrupting the transfer of native languages to the new generation. It also has serious 
consequences in terms of the spatiality of community identity in an era of satellite broadcasting where members of the 
same community in different localities can connect through television. Especially for those minorities that are usually 
dispersed through different locations or migrant com-munities, communicative ethnocide means the interruption of self-
imagination which is constructed through transnational satellite television. Finally, the ethnic media is able to engage and 
mobilise ethnic groups in an active way to become involved in everyday politics and right movements as well as 
community politics (Matsaganis et al., 2011). 
 Communicative ethnocide diminishes this potential for civic engagement by destroying the community’s own public 
sphere.  
The contemporary situation of Alevi television exemplifies these features of commu-nicative ethnocide where Alevi 
culture is being silenced in the media as a direct policy of the Turkish state. Drawing on interviews conducted with 
producers and managers of TV10 and Yol TV, I look at how the communicative ethnocide of Alevi television and its 
effects can be analysed in terms of four different dimensions: infrastructural, audience, transnational and resistance. For 
ethical concerns and given the current political climate in Turkey, in order to preserve the anonymity of my interviewees, I 
have used pseudo-nyms and have not specified their titles or the positions they hold in their organisations. I mention only 
the television station they work for. 
 
Infrastructural dimension 
 
Along with 11 channels most of which were Kurdish channels, TV10 was closed down under the state of emergency 
in September 2016 which also meant that all its equip-ment and infrastructure were confiscated to be sold to third 
parties. An appeal by TV10 to resume broadcasting was rejected by the state of emergency commission under the 
state of emergency which was still in effect as of October 2017.2 However, TV10 still operates online, albeit with 
limited resources and a reduced programme schedule which has resulted in a loss of a wide section of its audience 
who do not have Internet access. Yol TV’s blackout also took place in late 2016 under the state of emergency; 
however, the way it was silenced was different, but like TV10 it is also available online as well as through Internet 
Protocol Television (IPTV), which similarly has also resulted in a loss of audience.  
It is important to understand that communicative ethnocide is not necessarily totalitar-ian in the sense that it is possible 
for it to recognise and respond differently to the differ-ences, even nuances, contained within ethnic identities. The Turkish 
state’s varied approach to different Alevi television stations can be seen to be a result of this nuanced approach. Since the 
first Alevi TV station, TV Avrupa, started broadcasting, Alevi televi-sion has explored a variety of ways of representing 
Alevism and the Alevi identity from broadcasting video clips of Alevi music to producing programmes on Alevi religion. 
Until recently, the different Alevi TV channels could be clearly differentiated in terms of their loyalty with regard to the 
differing political orientations to be found within the Alevi movement and the effect that these loyalties had on 
programming content in rela-tion to Alevism itself. Thus, as well as reflecting different political orientations within the 
Alevi community, Cem TV, TV10 and Yol TV also adopted different definitions of Alevism. Within this variety of 
representations of Alevism, the state has a particular ‘preferred Alevism’ which clearly defines it as being a sect within 
Islam, and it is this definition of Alevism which is exemplified by the broadcast content of Cem TV. For many of my 
interviewees, the Cem Foundation and Cem TV is a state project which works to assimilate Alevis into the Turkish-Islam 
synthesis.3 This accounts for the fact that while TV10 and Yol TV, which do not promulgate this ‘preferred’ definition, 
have been subject to different forms of communicative ethnocide, Cem TV has remained untouched and is still on air. As 
Clastres (2010) and Yalcinkaya (2014) argue, ethnocide 
  
 
‘does not aim to annihilate ethnic identity, as is the case with genocide, but aims to make the Other resemble the Same and 
the more similar to the Same (in this case, Turkish-Sunni-Muslim), the better. This is the role that Cem TV assumes in its 
representation of Alevism, one that approximates Aleviness (Other) to Islam and Turkishness (Same). In many ways, it is 
similar to the Kurdish TV station TRT Kurdi, which was established by the Turkish state to fulfil the requirements of the 
European Union (EU), which can be thought as serving the same mission and representing the ‘preferred Kurdishness’.4  
The fact that different Alevi channels with different political orientations have been subjected to different 
measures is itself indicative of the complexity in understanding how communicative ethnocide works and how it 
needs to be distinguished from more crude forms of censorship. While both are violations by the state, 
communicative ethno-cide works by targeting a community and obstructing its communicative means in order to 
destroy the community’s cultural formation. Hence, I argue that the closure of TV10 and Yol TV cannot simply be 
seen as attacks on the freedom of speech but are deeply rooted within the state’s ethnocidal policy against Alevis 
and must be regarded as a spe-cific part of Alevi ethnocide. 
 
Audience dimension 
 
While it is more common to interfere in the content, production and regulation of ethnic television through the 
means of censorship and control, communicative ethnocide can also encompass the audience. In the case of Kurdish 
TV, the viewership itself can be regarded as an ethnic manifestation and communicative ethnocide has set its sights 
on viewership practices. The satellite dishes on top of the roofs of Kurdish residents were distinguishable with the 
change of satellites from Eutelsat to Intelsat and because of this the Turkish authorities were able to detect who was 
watching Med TV since the dishes acted as flags of identity. This resulted in 
 
the smashing of satellite dishes, the intimidation of viewers, dish vendors, dish installers, and coffee-houses; a more effective 
form of repression is cutting off electricity from villages and small towns during prime time hours when MED-TV is on the 
air. (Hassanpour, 1998: 61) 
 
This has not happened to the viewers of Alevi television as it is not possible to detect who they are by simple 
surveillance techniques as was the case of the Kurds. On the other hand, the closing of TV channels and limiting them to 
online communication has necessarily had an effect on the audience and the interviews conducted with those who work for 
Alevi television suggest that the closure of the channels has been a challenge, especially for those Alevis who live in 
remote and rural areas. The interviewees empha-sised the significance of Alevi television for Alevis who live in villages: 
 
For instance, before Yol TV we hadn’t been in contact with many communities [living in different regions]. With Yol TV we saw 
that there are Alevis living in different regions which we never thought of before. The Alevis [living in those regions] found an 
opportunity to express their feelings of fear, nervousness, hiding, all those human feelings. They felt ‘look, we have a television, we 
can talk and express ourselves’. A common value has been created [thanks to Yol 
 
TV]. In this sense, establishing television stations enabled us and Alevi organisations to reach the remote localities that we’ve 
never been able to before. This is very valuable, very meaningful. (Haydar, Yol TV) 
 
Our live broadcast vehicle enters a village. One of the women starts shouting and ululating ‘I said they will definitely come 
here!’[in Kurdish] This is a need… One of the characteristics which distinguishes TV10 from other channels is that it is not 
concerned with popularity. Many people can appear on the screen and give good talks. But TV10 with great respect put a mic 
in front of Alevis who live in villages where nobody visited and cared to ask about their opinion or thought who cares if they 
talk … (Seyit, TV10) 
 
Alevis living in rural areas find it much more difficult to represent themselves and to get their voices heard in 
local media and local politics. In this sense, Alevi television holds a symbolic significance for Alevis who live in 
remote places, particularly where there is a Sunni Muslim majority. On the other hand, one can argue that the 
closure of oppositional television stations in the aftermath of the attempted coup has pushed urban Alevis to rely 
more on Alevi television in order to receive information other than that provided by the government-supported 
media organisations. During my informal discus-sions with Alevis living in Ankara and Istanbul, especially those 
who do not or cannot use social media, they argued that they find it difficult to access reliable news sources after the 
closure of oppositional television channels including Alevi television. In this way, communicative ethnocide is more 
destructive during periods of authoritarianism and increasing censorship where communities require more 
information about the politi-cal agenda in order to protect and defend themselves. 
 
Transnational dimension 
 
The presence of Med TV and the studios, offices and production facilities of its successor stations in different European 
countries such as the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, Sweden and Russia reinforced the identity of Euro-
Kurdishness which as Soguk (2008:  
185) notes is cultivated through such a sense of aterritoriality and borderlessness. Despite its Euro-Kurdish identity, 
Kurdish broadcasting from Europe has been subjected to a transnational form of communicative ethnocide where 
various countries have been involved in the Turkish state’s attempt to silence Kurdish television. In Sinclair and 
Smets’ (2014) words, ‘[n]ever before in the history of European television broadcasting has there been a case in 
which the EU countries have aggressively fought to fine, censure and close down television channels broadcasting 
from within the EU’ (p. 320). This aggression by these EU countries has been stoked by international initiatives 
arising from the Turkish state. As Hassanpour (1998) comments, ‘[a]mong the Middle Eastern countries, Turkey is 
the first and the only one to use its full state power to silence MED-TV’, and in order to implement its 
communicative ethnocide the state has used different methods (p. 53). Within Turkey, it has ‘unleashed its coercive 
forces to prevent the reception of the airwaves within Turkey, whereas in Europe, it used diplomatic power, 
espionage, jamming, and various forms of intimidation to stop the emission of television signals’ (Hassanpour, 
1998: 53). 
  
 
Even though the Turkish state has attempted to intervene in Alevi politics in European countries with, for 
example, its attempt to change the curriculum for Alevi lessons taught in Germany (as communicated in an 
interview with a member of the Federation of Germany Alevi Unions), there has been no direct interference by the 
Turkish state in the broadcasting by Alevi television channels in Europe, unlike the situation with Kurdish 
television. However, the threat of possible action in the future and the measures taken against Alevi television in 
Turkey means that communicative ethnocide proves a risk to the transnational connectivity of Alevi community and 
thereby a transnational issue. Ali from Yol TV explains the extent to which Yol TV serves as a means of 
transnational con-nectivity for Alevis living in different countries: 
 
Because this television does not belong to individuals, firstly the German Federation of Alevi Unions then other European countries 
[the members of the Alevi Unions living in European countries] had to watch it. In such a position it means say you live in Cologne 
then you are able to watch what Alevis in Sweden do. You could watch what Alevis in Denmark do. Before that Alevis had to meet 
together once a year or every six months and they would explain the situation in the UK, Sweden, Denmark and so on. But thanks to 
this system which has started a year ago, those in the UK were able to follow activities in Duisburg. (Ali, Yol TV) 
 
This is not only the case with Yol TV which is run by the European Confederation of Alevi Unions. As well as 
having a studio in Germany, TV10 also serves as a medium for the transnational connectivity of the Alevi 
community in Turkey and Europe. Both channels have specific programmes which are produced in and about 
different locali-ties in Turkey and Europe giving voice to the Alevi communities living in these vari-ous local 
contexts. As most of the channels have been based in Europe and have appealed to Alevis in Turkey as well as 
Europe, Alevi television has made a signifi-cant contribution towards the transnational experience of Alevis. As my 
interviews with television workers in Germany and Alevi audiences in Europe suggest, Alevi television has reflected 
and re-constructed the transnational Alevi public sphere as they have culturally bonded Alevis living in different 
countries and localities, have helped Alevi organisations to expand transnationally, and have enabled the Alevi 
community to gain confidence in being more explicit about their identity. Hence, the closure of Alevi channels and 
the consequent reduction in its audience has had signifi-cant transnational consequences for the community. It 
interrupts the circulation of information in different localities and hinders European Alevis’ involvement with 
Turkish politics and the interconnectedness of Alevis in Turkey and in Europe. In this regard, it is not the 
communicative ethnocide of only those Alevis in Turkey but also the transnational Alevi community which is 
connected on a day-to-day basis through satellite television.  
Both Kurdish and Alevi television broadcasting in the Turkish context demonstrates communicative ethnocide 
does not necessarily have only a national dimension despite the fact that it is implemented by the nation state. 
Instead, in the era of satellite and digi-tal technologies, communicative ethnocide can and does take place in a 
transnational context where various national and international actors are involved as has been the case with Med TV 
and its successor television stations. 
 Resistance dimension 
 
Communicative ethnocide is not a one-way stream so to speak. Communities which are targeted by it can also resist 
ethnocide through different methods and means. These include the use of different media like broadcasting online, 
finding more creative ways of engaging in media activism such as encouraging citizen journalism, and transferring 
their human resources to different media organisations or using them for different media productions. The 
experience of Kurdish and Alevi television epitomises the resistance against communicative ethnocide. Both TV10 
and Yol TV do not regard their closure as an end but are looking for alternative ways to continue broadcasting, as 
well as seeking out temporary solutions in order to survive conditions under the Turkish state of emer-gency. Hasan 
from TV10 explains how they are planning new documentary projects, some with the help and sponsorship of the 
community, despite the fact that their equip-ment has been confiscated: 
 
We signed contracts with some of our friends [previous workers] after the closure of TV10. We are trying to produce some 
programmes that we’ve been unable to do when TV10 was on air. As a preparation, as a transition to a new television, there is a crew 
of five to six people in Turkey. They are working on documentaries on Alevi ocaks, significant Alevi women in history such as Ana 
Fatma and Elif Ana. They co-produce and work as separate groups simultaneously. We’ve been unable to do these while on air, even 
if we wanted to because responding to the daily agenda and daily routine of the channel did not allow us. (Hasan, TV10) 
 
In this case, the production of documentaries also operate as a mean of resistance which can help the previous 
workers of the channel remain engaged and used for researching and producing more about Alevi culture. This also 
operates as a means of existing during the period of political chaos as the future of media freedom in Turkey does 
not seem very promising and TV10’s future in particular continues to be uncertain due to legal complications arising 
from the decree laws passed as part of the state of emergency. The fact that TV10 has been based both in Germany 
and Turkey has, according to Hasan, also helped a great deal in ensuring the survival of the channel. Even though 
they have no access to the technical infrastructure in Turkey, they have been able to broadcast online thanks to their 
equipment in Germany and, in this regard, transnationalism has helped Alevi television to survive and has worked 
against the attempts of communicative ethnocide. In this, they have been more fortunate than their Kurdish 
counterparts. Currently, there have also been demonstrations taking place in Istanbul every Saturday with the 
attendance of various Alevi organisations protesting at the closure of TV10.  
Yol TV has also employed various strategies to retain its audience during the black-out. It broadcasts online and 
tries to encourage its viewers to move to the IPTV system where viewers can watch Yol TV on their television 
through the use of a special device fitted to it. Yol TV benefits from events organised by the European 
Confederation of Alevi Unions which are used to inform the community about this new system and at which the 
IPTV boxes are available for sale. My interviews with, for example, Ali, Haydar and Turabi from Yol TV explain 
how the channel seeks a long-term solution to the disruption caused by the instabilities of Turkish politics and the 
pressures from the 
 Turkish state. These include changing the satellite through which Yol TV is broadcast as well as using terrestrial 
broadcasting. Both of these solutions suggest a Europe-centred vision which anticipates the future of Yol TV in the 
European broadcasting market. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Communicative ethnocide does not take place in a vacuum, instead it should be seen as part of a broader project of 
ethnocide. Even though it has taken place within the specific conditions of the period after the attempted coup, 
during which the AKP government has aimed to re-establish its authority over different factions of the opposition, 
the closure of TV10 and Yol TV must be regarded as part of the pre-existing ethnocide policy of the Turkish state 
for whom satellite broadcasting is regarded as a further challenge to its broader national policies and its project of 
constructing the ‘ideal citizen’. At the same time, satellite broadcasting has proved an opportunity for migrant 
communities like Alevis to reaffirm existing identities while constructing an imagined transnational one within a 
transnational public sphere and to pursue their political ambitions. But satellite technology does not guarantee a 
realm which is free from state interventions as Kurdish and Alevi television exemplify, even though Alevi 
television, through the use of online broadcasting technology, managed to circumvent these interventions, although 
with a more limited size of audience.  
The Alevi case demonstrates that the opportunities for resistance to communicative ethnocide are very much bounded 
by the community’s transnational capabilities, includ-ing community organisations, the political mobilisation of its 
members and the commu-nity’s infrastructural media investments. The attempt by Yol TV to promote IPTV technology 
among the members of the European Alevi community can be regarded as an example of this resistance. The need to 
promote new types of digital communication technology for Alevis in Turkey as well as audiences abroad presents a 
challenge for Alevi broadcasting that wishes to resist communicative ethnocide. While technological advances do not 
necessarily guarantee the creation of a freer transnational public sphere for communities such as Alevis they can provide 
short term, and possibly even longer term, opportunities for survival in the face of a communicative ethnocide directed by 
the state. But the future of transnational Alevi broadcasting and the fight against communi-cative ethnocide is uncertain 
and may well take different directions in Turkey and Europe. 
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Notes 
 
1. Within the Alevi community, there is an ongoing debate about whether Alevism is or is not part of Islam. In line with the 
views of the Alevi Unions, my interviewees from Yol TV regard Alevism as a religion in its own right and have coined the 
term ‘a religion of nature’ with reference to its respect for nature. My interviewees from TV10, on the other hand, tend to 
embrace many different interpretations of Alevism including those which consider it as a sect of Islam or is in some sense a 
‘truer’ form of Islam. 
 
2. TV10 has received an official document indicating that it was closed as a result of the decree. However, the appeal 
submitted to the State of Emergency Commission was rejected on the grounds that the channel was closed down not by the 
decree but by the decision of a commis-sion working for the Prime Ministry.  
3. The Turkish-Islam synthesis can be regarded as the founding principle of the Turkish Republic where the ideal citizenship is 
described around the composition of Turkishness and Muslimness. However, the term Turkish-Islam synthesis became an 
ideological programme in the 1980s and was reinforced by the state (Guvenc et al., 1991).  
4. Smets (2016: 742) mentions that TRT 6’s editors are journalists who were recruited among the Gulenists before the coup and at a 
time when the Gulenists were supported by the govern-ment. This also indicates the state’s approach to the communicative 
ethnocide of the Kurds which is one of Islamising them through the means of a religious organisation, in other words, reassembling 
the Other (Kurdish) as the Same (Turkish) through the use of the common ground of religion (Islam). It is no coincidence that TRT 
6 has been more attractive to those Kurds who are more religious and for whom their Muslim identity matters (Arsan, 2014). 
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